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Abstract 
 
Cape Verde, as many developing countries, is attempting to extend the social 
protection toward the independent workers, which represent about 32% of the 
country employed force. This work project analysis the impacts of the Cape Verde self-
employed social security framework, under both individual and scheme perspectives. 
Based on overlapping generations projections that allows for life-cycle behavior, we 
find that the returns on the pension contributions are negative for men, and that the 
scheme might not be financially sustainable, over a sixty year horizon.  
Keywords: self-employed, social security, individuals return on pension contributions, 
scheme financial sustainability  
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1. Introduction 
Half of the world’s population (workers and their families) is excluded from any type of 
statutory security protection against the so-called social risks.1 The lack of social 
protection affects primarily the growing vulnerable populations of developing 
countries, the workers outside of the formal economy.2 In most of the cases, this 
poorest and unskilled population (self-employed in small businesses and their recruits)  
is averse to compromise a relatively high proportion of their low and variable earnings 
to finance insurance that does not meet their priority needs (immediate consumption, 
health care and primary education for their child), as stated by van Ginneken (2003)3. 
In other cases, administrative bottleneck and problems with compliance restrict the 
informal workers access to the statutory schemes. Lack of confidence on the public 
schemes (due to poor management), also, leads many of this work force to rely on 
informal safety nets to cope with idiosyncratic shocks (van Ginneken 1999)4. However, 
these family and community base supports are limited in addressing common shocks 
and situations of extreme poverty. Moreover, they are falling apart, in many countries, 
with the increasing urbanization (Murdoch, 1999).  
Hence, the growing vulnerability of a relevant share of population is justifying 
major reforms on the developing countries statutory schemes, in attempt to both, 
properly, expand the coverage of the contributory pension (for those who can afford 
                                                          
1
 According to ILO (2010). Furthermore, it is stated that only 20% of the world population is covered 
properly against unemployment, sickness and old age poverty risks. 
2
 The lack of social protection specially affects Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where the statutory 
scheme are estimated to reach only 5 to 10% of the working population (those who have qualified and 
stable jobs). Nonetheless, most of the social security schemes in those countries are open to the 
informal workers participation (on a voluntary basis), as stated by van Ginneken (1999).  
The informal (but legal) economy can be defined as the “market-based production of goods and services 
that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP” Smith (1985). Both, OIT (2005) and Schneider 
(2002) find that governance and institutions issues are the main determinants of the weight of the 
informal economy in developing countries. At the global level the informal economy employs about 50% 
of the labor force, while in Sub-Saharan Africa these vulnerable employment reaches 75,5% of the 
working force, according to the International Labor Organization estimates (ILO, 2010). 
3
 In addition, they seek protection in case of death and disability rather than against old age poverty 
(van Ginneken, 1999). 
4
 By structuring savings club, providing reciprocal needs-based gift exchange, among others solidarity 
mechanisms. 
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it) and to extend the tax financed protection (non-contributory), for the financially 
constrained individuals.  
Though, the policy is challenging. On one hand, absence of official records of 
the informal sector earnings makes it difficult to enforce contributions, for the 
universal benefits program. On the other hand, little fiscal space (given the size of the 
informal economy) restraints the public provision of the tax base pension. Thus, efforts 
to integrate the self-employed workers into the statutory schemes have mixed success 
(van Ginneken, 2003), most of them involving government subsidizing part of the 
contributions.5 
The aim of this work project is to provide an assessment of the Cape Verde’s 
case, in particular of the self-employed social security scheme. In Cape Verde the very 
first experience to extend social security protection started in 2001, with the 
introduction of a law establishing the framework for a multipillar scheme, followed by 
a specific law for the self-employed social protection, in 2003. However, the National 
Insurance Institute (INPS) reports that, by the end of 2009, only 8 independent 
workers (in a universe of close to 50 thousand) were part of the system. The low 
adherence motivated the revision of the 2003’s law in late 2009. In the same period, 
another law, targeted to the domestic servants was published. 
In order to evaluate the self-employed social security program we undertook 
two different exercises. The first one consisted in computing the expected return on 
the pension contributions for several representative workers, with the objectives of 
                                                          
5
 One of the successful experiences comes from Tunisia. According to Chabane (2002) the statutory 
scheme was able to affiliated almost 70.000 new members on a two years period. The enforcement 
framework and the accurate estimation of the needs and financial capacity of the targeted groups were 
found to be crucial for the accomplishments. Moreover, the existing social security program was 
adapted to meet the needs  of each target group, and both contributions and benefits were set on a flat 
rate basis. India, China and Egypt are other successful cases. As reported by van Ginneken (2003), the 
India scheme reached 400.000 home-based beedi workers under the Employees’ Provident Fund Act. 
China also facilitated the entry of the self-employed and informal economy workers on the statutory 
scheme, by adapting the benefit and the contribution structures to the particular features of the urban 
and rural workers. Egypt has prescribed minimum insurable earnings levels for different occupations, so 
as to meet the contributory capacity of the self-employed. 
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uncover the reasons behind the low responsiveness of the 2003 law, estimate if the 
required contribution is within the financial capacity of individuals and assess if the 
program is proficient in providing reliable means to smooth life time consumption. The 
second exercise entailed a projection of the system revenues and expenditures for a 
sixty years horizon. Apart from appraising if the scheme is financially sound, we also 
tested its resilience to shocks from economic and demographic volatility.  
According to our estimates, the revised program is affordable by the targeted 
population; however, the returns on the pension contribution are negative for men, 
who retire later and have shorter life expectancy. This result may explain, among other 
reasons, the observed low adherence. In line with our baseline assumptions, the 
program is not financially sound, suggesting some inter-generations redistribution.  
The report proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief theoretical 
introduction to social security programs. Section 3 presents some information about 
the Cape Verde economy and describes the self-employed framework. Section 4 
describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 5 computes the individuals’ 
returns on the pension contribution. Section 6 provides the budgetary impacts of the 
scheme, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Social Security – A Brief Theoretical Introduction 
Public old age pension schemes, part of the social insurance systems, are one of the 
main programs run by government across the world.6 The social insurance programs 
are linked to the major objectives of the welfare state, namely efficiency and equity 
promotion, and aim at minimizing the disutility that risk averse workers have when 
faced with uncertainties (regarding, e.g., the contingencies and length of sickness and 
unemployment episodes, and old age poverty).  
                                                          
6
 According to ILO (2006) the public transfers to finance social protection represents 15% to 30% of the 
GDP in Europe, and hovers 20% of the GDP in North America. Whereas, this kind of public spending 
represents less than 5% of GDP, in both Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia. 
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The public provision of old age pensions through Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
schemes is perceived to be important to counter for individuals life cycle myopia 
(which leads them to under-save against old age poverty), to prevent free-riding 
behavior in the presence of altruism, and to assure vertical income redistribution, 
based on life time earnings (Feldstein and Liebman, 2002).7 As opposed of funded 
schemes, which provides retirement pension based on individuals assets accumulation 
during the working life, PAYG (defined benefits) are contributory unfunded universal 
benefit programs, where the pension provision does not necessarily meet the 
individual’s prior contributions.8 In such system, the pension of a current retired 
population is financed through an income tax (payroll tax) levied on the current 
workforce.9 Thus, the pension of the retired population is determined as follow: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 ∗ 𝑤𝑡 ∗ 𝑡  
 Where 𝑃𝑡 , 𝑁𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡  stand, respectively, for the period t pension, working force, 
wages and payroll tax. Accordingly, and assuming that the payroll tax is kept 
unchanged from period t to period t+1, the current working population pension 
contribution return, is:  
 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
=  𝑁𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑤𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑡 /( 𝑁𝑡 ∗ 𝑤𝑡 ∗ 𝑡)= 1 + 𝑛 ∗ (1 + 𝑔) 
where 𝑛 and 𝑔 stand for the population and wage growth rates, respectively.10 In turn, 
the government faces in each period the following budget constraint:11 
                                                       𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝐵𝑡  + 𝐺𝑡  +𝑃𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡                                                                 
                                                          
7
Roughly, the same efficiency arguments justify the appropriate regulation of the private pension 
schemes. In many countries, Chile for instance, instead of actually supply the pension insurance 
government makes compulsory the workers participation in the private schemes (funded schemes). 
However, the PAYG schemes are viewed to be superior than funded schemes in handling inflation 
shocks and others common shocks, such as unfavorable business cycle (Barr, 2004). 
8
 In the defined benefits scheme the worker is promised an annuity at retirement, generally based on 
some average of the last working life income.  
9
 In this overlapping generations representation we are assuming that (i) individuals have finite lives, 
which evolve in two distinct stages, working life and retirement; (ii) they only face idiosyncratic risks, the 
workers face potential income loss (e.g. due to sudden sickness), while the retirees face the longevity 
risk. 
10
 The wages are supposed to follow the economy (technological) progress. 
11
 Notice that we are neglecting the monetary funding, in this case. 
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Where 𝐵𝑡+1, 𝑟𝐵𝑡  , 𝑃𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑡  are, respectively, the government funding need in 
period t+1; the outstanding debt service in period t;  the expenditures with the social 
security; others government expenditures and the income tax levied on the working 
force, including the payroll tax. Moreover, in the long run, the sovereign solvency 
requires that the government primary budget surplus (excluding the expenditure with 
the debt services) is sufficient to repay (all) the accumulated debt.  
Thus, the (defined benefits social) security programs redistributes from the 
retired generation to the working generation, whenever the working force and the 
economy grows, as well as from rich to poor (given that the pension is a lump sum 
expenditure, whereas the contribution is income related).  
 
3. The Self-Employed Social Security Framework 
3.1. Cape Verde Economy - A Brief Overview 
Cape Verde is a small middle income African economy, essentially driven by the 
services sector (which represented 67% of the GDP, in 2008, according to the Central 
Bank estimates), and in particular by tourism activity (19% of GDP). Since the late 90’s, 
the country is experiencing a steady economic growth (6,8% on average, in the last 
decade), relatively low inflation (2,5% on average), and generally a quite favorable 
macroeconomic conditions.12 The macroeconomic policy pursuit (fiscal consolidation 
and tight monetary policy) in order to support the exchange rate regime (currency peg 
to the Euro), in place since 1998, by contributing to strength the economy 
fundamentals, is the main responsible for this positive performance.13  
However, the country is still very dependent on exogenous foreign capital 
inflows, such as emigrant remittances and official grants, which represented 
                                                          
12
Some selected country’s economic and financial indicators are presented in Appendix 2. 
13
 The currency peg was firstly established with the Portuguese the escudos. One of the conditions 
imposed to the country, in the sequence of the exchange rate agreement signed with the Portuguese 
government, was the adoption of the Maastricht criteria as benchmark. This allowed to strength the 
economy fundamentals, and enhanced the country’s ability to attract foreign investments. 
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respectively 8,5% and 6,7% of GDP in 2008.14 The unemployment rate is, also, high 
(17,8% in 2008, as reported by the survey conducted jointly by the National Statistics 
and Employment Institutes). In addition, the economy stands largely reliant on 
informal activities. Self-employment represented 31,4% of the working force in 2008, 
according to IEFP-INE (2008), and 13,7% of employed force were unpaid family and 
others recruits of the own account business.15 The informal entrepreneurship is the 
key driver of the extractive industry, agriculture and retail activities, employing, 
respectively, 96%, 92% and 64% of the total working force of these sectors.  
 
3.2. Social Security Protection in Cape Verde 
Social security protection is a Constitutional right in Cape Verde.16 Accordingly, the 
social insurance law (Law N0 131/V/2001) establishes a multipillar pension system, 
comprising a means tested, non-contributory pillar, targeted to individuals living below 
the poverty line (defined by the National Statistics Institute as 1,25 Euro per day); a 
contributory and compulsory scheme run by the National Insurance Institute (INPS); 
and a fully-funded private pillar, designed as a complement of the contributory 
scheme.  
The INPS scheme, which provides comprehensive social protection (pensions, 
family benefits and health care) covers approximately 38% of the country´s total 
employed force, in both private and public sectors (new employed force from 2005).17 
INPS is relatively young organization, both chronologically (operating from 1982) and 
                                                          
14
 According to the Central Bank statistics, available at www.bcv.cv. 
15
 The employment survey conducted jointly by the Employment Institute (IEFP) and the National 
Statistics Institute (INE) is targeted to a randomized sample of families of all the country regions. The 
survey is carried out since 2006, on a two-year basis, in both rural and urban areas. It aims at evaluating 
the family life conditions, as well. The methodology used is direct interviews, consistent with the 
International Labor Organization’s recommendations. Detailed information about the methodology and 
results are provided by www.ine.cv and www.iefp.cv. 
16
  As defined in the article 69
 th 
of
 
the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Cape Verde. 
17
 The scheme covers about 28% of the country’s population (workers and families). 
The Central Bank and the government run their own special schemes, which are being progressively 
integrated in INPS. 
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demographically (with the dependency ratio hovering 18).18 Thus the youth, besides a 
parametric reform approved in 2005 (Decree Law N0 51/2005) is responsible for its 
favorable financial situation (with a trust fund that amounts 15% of GDP).19  
 
3.3. The Self-Employed Social Insurance Framework 
The first self-employed insurance framework (Decree Law N0 28/2003) was targeted to 
specific professional categories (services rendered), whose contribution was 
compulsory for old age pensions and optional for other contingencies. For old age 
pensions only, they were required to contribute 11,5% of  income; whereas for all the 
social insurance protection the payroll tax rate was 19,5%.  
In 2009, the independent workers social insurance law was extended to all self-
employed with a minimum monthly income of 8.800 Cape-Verdean Escudos (CVE), the 
public servant’s minimum wage (Decree Law N0 48/2009). The contribution rate of the 
self-employed (and spouse) was set at 19,5%, and included all the social protection, 
without possibility of opting out of specific categories, as under the precedent law. 
Accordingly, the law established as mandatory the enrollment of all independent 
workers, female under 45 years old and male younger than 50 years old. The gender 
discrimination is consistent with the retirement age (60 years old for women, and 65 
years old for men) and aim at meeting the old age pension minimum required 
contribution length (15 years of contributions). 
 
4. Data Availability and Empirical Strategy 
The available records of self-employment in Cape Verde are sparse and aggregated. 
The information refers to the number, gender structure, average worker age and 
average income per sector of activity, as presented in Table 1. 
                                                          
18
 The dependency ratio is the number of contributors over the number of beneficiaries. 
19
 The reform was designed to cope with the worsening demographic condition, due to both the scheme 
natural maturing and population ageing. With the reform, the size of the promised pension for a full 
career worker was lowered from 86% of the average 3 best yearly earnings of the last 5 years of 
contribution, to 80% of the average 10 best incomes of the last 15 years of contribution. 
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Table 1: A Snapshot of the Self-Employment in Cape Verde 
 
On the other hand, quite detailed data on the current beneficiaries of the 
statutory scheme is available, with individual records that include age, wage and 
gender, from 1982 to 2008. Thus, our strategy is to complement the available 
information of the self-employment with these detailed records on salaried workers, 
assuming that the two groups of workers are not significantly different. In this sense, 
we decided to exclude agriculture, fishing and extractive industry from our analysis. 
The very high proportion of self-employment in those sectors precludes us from using 
the formal sector information as a benchmark.20  
As shown in Table 2, the most relevant difference between the two groups 
relates to the wage, with the salaried workers enjoying relatively higher wages, on 
average, unless for the first quartile. The wage differential is consistent with the 
estimated schooling gap between the two groups. According to Ministério de Emprego 
e Qualificação Profissional (2008) records, more than 60% of the self-employed only 
have the primary school degree or are illiterated, whereas 67% of the salaried force 
has at least secondary schooling.21 
                                                          
20
 Notice that more than 90% of the employed force of these sectors is informal workers. 
21
 In an attempt to further validate our strategy, we interviewed 10 informal workers from different 
activity sectors. While it is hard to argue that the conclusions from this survey are representative of the 
self-employed population, it is worthwhile to remarks that (i) the reported characteristics regarding age 
and schooling are quite similar to the available data on the self-employed and (ii) 4 persons reported 
Total Age Wage
1
Workers (Average) (Average, CVE
2)
Agriculture and Fishing 26.139 40 60 38 32.639
Extractive Industry 2.554 67 33 31 54.657
Manufactures 4.266 34 66 39 24.665
Construction 8.949 9 91 33 63.553
Retails 15.572 65 35 39 35.567
Hotels and Restaurants 887 63 37 32 27.728
Transports and Communication 1.969 17 83 39 35.090
Other Services 544 64 37 40 29.523
Notes: The data on  number of workers, gender and average age are from the 2008 employment 
survey (IEFP-INE, 2008). The wage distribution data  is from the 2002 Business Census (INE, 2002). 
1Monthly average wage.
21 EUR=110,3 CVE
Female (%) Male (%)
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Table 2: The Main Characteristics of the Employed Force  
 
 
5. The Individual Return on the Self-Employed Pension Scheme 
The expected rate of return of the pension scheme is calculated, for several 
representative workers, according to the formula:   
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
− 1 
With the purpose of evaluating the cost of contributing for the old age pension 
in its best alternative use, we choose, for the computations, the individual marginal 
rate of time preference (rate at which individuals make the trade-off between current 
and future consumptions) as the best return on savings, i.e. the highest annual return 
on term deposits (3,5% in real terms, based on the Central Bank’s data).22  
                                                                                                                                                                          
some mobility between the formal and the informal jobs, while 1 complements the business with a 
formal job. The main results are presented in appendix 3. 
22
 Note that this critical assumption implies that our targeted population has access to the financial 
market, face the same interest rate and are willing to trade the current for the future consumption at 
the same rate. Furthermore, this assumption rules out transactions costs and uncertainty. Notice, also, 
Number 32.186,0 35.217,0 -8,6
Gender
Female (%) 42,3 39,2 7,9
Male (%) 57,7 60,8 -5,1
Age 
Mean 37,1 38,5 -3,7
Median 39,0 38,5 1,2
Standard  Deviation 3,6 9,8
Wage (CVE)
Quartile I 28.176,5 20.000,0 40,9
Quartile II 32.306,7 38.455,0 -16,0
Quartile III 35.448,0 64.121,5 -44,7
Quartile IV 63.552,7 989.443,0 -93,6
Mean 36.020,9 49.596,0 -27,4
Standard  Deviation 14.135,3 43.358,0
Notes: 
1 Based on the employment survey of 2008 (INE-IEFP, 2008) excluding agriculture, fishing and 
extractive industry. The wage  distribution is in l ine with the Business Census of 2002 (INE, 2002).
2 Sample of the current contributors of INPS with monthly wage  8.800 CVE, based on 2008
records.
3 [(Self-Employed  -  Salaried Workers) / Salaried Workers] *100
Relative Difference3Salaried Workers2Self-Employed1
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In order to project the contributions and the retirement pension flows we 
estimate the life cycle income in line with the human capital earnings function 
proposed by Mincer in 1974 (Willis, 1986) of the form:  
𝐿𝑛𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝑢𝑖  
Where 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥𝑖 , stand for income, schooling level, and age of the individual 𝑖, 
respectively, while 𝑢𝑖  is an  error term. The coefficient β1 provides an estimate of the 
constant rate of returns to education, whilst the coefficients of 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖
2, with 
expected opposite signs, yield the return of the experience term, and confer the 
concave shape to the earnings profile.23 In our case, since the INPS sample lack both 
reliable data on experience and schooling information, we approximated the life cycle 
income of the independent workers by the following cross sectional quartiles 
regressions, to account for the skill premium and activity sector earnings 
differentials:24  
 
   Quartile 1: 𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 8,186858 + 0,077296𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 0,000833𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 + 0,133126𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟       
 
   Quartile 2:𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 7,889445 + 0,129724𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 0,001423𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 − 0,032816𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟       
         
   Quartile 3: 𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 9,222000 + 0,077472𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 0,000728𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 − 0,003535𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟       
                                        
   Quartile 4: 𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 9,593364 + 0,107496𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 0,001044𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 + 0,135020𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟       
 
         
                                                                                                                                                                          
that IEFP (1997) reports that 67% of the informal businesses have access to formal financial market, 
which makes our assumption not completely unrealistic. 
Given the nominal rate (from the Central Bank statistics), the savings real rate was calculated 
considering the twelve month inflation rate of 2009 (1%, according to the National Statistics Institute). 
The highest market savings rate is the 2 years term deposits rate. Though, the individuals can enjoy 
higher returns with some stock market products. Thus, aiming at control some market imperfection, in 
particularly, regarding this special population, we are being conservative.  
23
 In the absence of reliable data on experience, a transformation of the workers age is commonly used 
as proxy (Willis, 1986). Hence, 𝑥𝑖  is determined by subtracting the worker age to his years of schooling, 
supposing that he is full-time employed, immediately after completing his education. 
24
  These regressions allow us to make a more robust inference about the evolution of the wages, under 
the assumption that the individuals do not change the respective quartiles along their life cycle. 
The regressions results are presented in appendix 1. Gender is a dummy variable (male 1 and female 0), 
included to account for the wage discrimination among men and women. All the coefficients are 
significantly different than 0 at 1%. Notice that we used robust standard errors to account for 
heteroskedasticity. According to these estimates, the wage of an individual in the second year of 
contribution, is for instance = [1 +  𝑙𝑛 𝑤26 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑤25) ∗ 𝑤25, where w25 and w26 are the individual 
wages at ages 25 and 26, respectively. 
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The remaining baseline assumptions for the computations are: 1) the payroll 
tax rate, which is 19,5% of yearly income, from which 10% are allocated to pension 
provision; 2) the length of contribution (40 years for men and 35 years for women, 
according to the law); 3) the life expectancy which is 75 years old for women and 70 
years old for men, according to the INE demographics projections, based on the 
population census of 2000; 4) the retirement pension which is equal to 80% of the 
average of the 10 best incomes of the last 15 years of contribution. We also use 
alternative assumptions on discount rate and life cycle income, as a means to test for 
the robustness of our results.  
As shown in Table 3, at the baseline scenario the expected rate of return on 
pensions are negatives for men, whilst positives for women, who retire earlier and live 
longer.25 The women expected returns decline, although remaining positives, when we 
simulate an income shock, setting the wages growth rate equal to 0. On the other 
hand, even doubling the incomes growth rate the men expected returns remain 
negatives. 
Relaxing further the perfect financial market assumption and considering that 
due to credit rationing people will under invest, a sensitivity analysis dropping the 
discount rate below the savings rate by two percentage points, increases the men 
returns, but not enough to make them positive.26 In turn, halving the pensions’ 
                                                          
25
 Notice that for the income projections, we are using the average wages, as reported by INE (2002), as 
the starting career earnings. Since the self-employed framework law targets the business owner of a 
sole proprietorship and spouse, we suppose that on aggregated their earnings are equal to their 
business cash flow (i.e. close to the activity highest wages). However, we are considering some tendency 
to under report.  
It is important to highlight that even the poorest individual (according to Decree Law N0 48/2009 the one 
who earns 8.800 CVE per month) does not qualify for the minimum pension (4.260 CVE per month).  
26
 This analysis is similar to a case aiming at evaluate the individuals opportunity cost of contributing at a 
one year Euribor trend. Given the exchange rate regime and being a small open economy, we are 
considering the Euribor rates as the closest analogue to the country’s world interest rate.  
Notice that the men internal rate of returns on pension contribution (i.e. the rate at which the 
individuals net benefits is 0) is less than 1%, which is smaller than any market rate. Moreover, the men 
are required to live on average more 8 years, so as to their returns become positives. In appendix 1 are 
provided some illustrations of the sensitivity of the men returns to discount rate and life expectancy. 
13 
 
discount rate, in order to place higher weight on benefits that occurs far in the future, 
yield positive returns for the men enjoying the highest wages (at quartiles 3 and 4). 
Table 3: Baseline Expected Returns on the Pension Contribution and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Notes: Contribution in period t (Ct) = 10%*wages in period t.  
Pension (P) =10%*average of 10 best wages of last 15 years of contribution. 
𝐶𝑓 =  
(𝐶𝑡)
(1+𝑟)𝑡
;   𝐶𝑚 =  
(𝐶𝑡)
(1+𝑟)𝑡
; 39𝑡=0  
34
𝑡=0    𝑃𝑓 =  
𝑃
(1+𝑟)𝑡
49
𝑡=35 ;     𝑃𝑚 =  
𝑃
(1+𝑟)𝑡
44
𝑡=40        
 
Thus, considering these consistent results, negative expected returns are likely 
to prevent the forward looking rational men to join the statutory scheme and 
therefore might, partially, explain the low responsiveness to the 2003 law.27 On the 
other hand, an analysis to the closed list of the professional categories, the Decree Law 
N0 28/2003 target, suggests a negative selection bias. The list only includes services 
rendered, which represents only 0,9% of total self-employed force  (see other services 
                                                          
27
 Notice that men are 58% of the self-employed force, according to INE records (see Table 2). 
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV
338.118 387.684 425.376 762.632
Present Value of Pension Contribution  ( Cf ) 902.898 1.203.103 1.269.667 2.542.127
Present Value of Retirement Pensions ( Pf  ) 1.389.303 1.937.870 2.142.036 4.434.829
Expected Rate of Return on Pension Contribution 53,9% 61,1% 68,7% 74,5%
Present Value of Pension Contribution  ( Cm ) 959.253 1.269.759 940.187 2.737.435
Present Value of Retirement Pensions ( Pm ) 437.809 584.458 401.654 1.451.657
Expected Rate of Return on Pension Contribution -54,4% -54,0% -48,4% -47,0%
1. Income shock (income growth rate = 0)
Female Expected Rate of Return 38,2% 38,2% 38,2% 38,2%
Male Expected Rate of Return -57,3% -57,3% -57,3% -57,3%
2. Doubling Income Growth rate
Female Expected Rate of Return 68,9% 82,0% 98,9% 109,0%
Male Expected Rate of Return -51,9% -51,8% -39,7% -37,3%
3. Discount rate below the savings rate by 2 p.p.
Female Expected Rate of Return 156,5% 166,9% 176,7% 184,3%
Male Expected Rate of Return -25,6% -25,1% -17,6% -15,8%
4. Halving the Pension Discount Rate
Female Expected Rate of Return 212,3% 227,0% 242,5% 254,1%
Male Expected Rate of Return -6,7% -5,9% 5,6% 8,4%
Incomes (yearly, CVE)
Baseline Case 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Female
Male
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in Table 1). Furthermore, the minimum income level of each professional category 
defined in the list seems excessively high (see appendix 4). Indeed, according to the 
business census records (see Table 1), the other services earnings were on average 
69% below the lowest income considered in the referred list, suggesting that the law 
was requiring prohibitive contributions. In turn, assessing the role of hyperbolic 
discounting and myopia on the low adherence requires a more detailed investigation. 
The savings rate reported by the Central Bank (on average 13,5% and 9,8%, in nominal 
and real terms, respectively) only captures the formal financial system. The weight of 
the savings accumulated in the informal sector is not known. Besides, the financial 
market is still underdeveloped and incomplete. The stock market started functioning 
only as from 2005; microcredit institutions that care for the ones who do not have 
collateral to qualify for bank loans are recent in the country and there is no pension 
fund yet. Furthermore, difficulties with enforcement and public awareness can, also, 
explain the reduced number of self-employed in the statutory scheme.  
In general, although the expected returns are negative for men, the program 
provides reliable means to smooth consumption. However, in order to maintain the 
pre-retirement living standards, both men and women are required to save. Moreover, 
according to our baseline assumptions, the savings gap, given by the ratio of the 
pension benefit to pre-retirement earnings, is on average close to 10% for women and 
20% for men. 
 
6. The Budgetary Impacts of the Self-Employed Social Security Scheme  
The financial sustainability of the self-employed program is assessed by subtracting the 
present value of the pension expenditures (P) from the present value of the 
contributions revenues (C), for a time range of 60 years. Let us know detail the 
assumptions we made in order to perform this projection exercise: 
15 
 
1. Ten percent of the current population of self-employed will join the scheme in the 
next 10 years (3.219 individuals).28  
2. Based on the medium run trend of self-employment (average yearly increase of 
1,7%, from 1997 to 2008), we assume that the informal economy will create on 
average 1,5% new jobs per year. This 0,2 percentage point differential aim at capturing 
the observed fall in the self-employment weight on total labor force.29 Ten percent of 
this work force is estimated to join the system in 2011. From 2011 onwards, the 
statutory scheme will gradually improve its attractiveness for the new self-employed 
population, reaching 20% by 2016. This increase in adherence is likely to result from 
the INPS strategy of (i) enhance program’s awareness and (ii) open branches in 
geographical areas where the informal sector is pervasive.30 We expect that this new 
cohort will reach 6.491 individuals by the end of 2070. 
3. Women will join the program in a higher proportion than men.31 For the current 
employed force we take the existing gender distribution (see Table 2). However, in the 
first four years (2011-2014) we set the women’s adherence rate equal to 60% of the 
total adherence per year. From 2015 onwards, we assume that men adherence will 
catch up and overcome the women participation rate, gradually. For the new 
contributors the women share is 55% against 45% of men share. 
                                                          
28
 Notice that we are being conservative, given the results of the 2003 self-employment social security 
framework. 
29
 According to IEFP-INE (2008), between 2008 and 2006 the total self-employed weight on the total 
employed force decreased by 1 percentage point. However, we cannot tell for sure if this behavior is 
structural or it is an effect of some short run business’s environmental change.  
30
 The INPS strategy is close to the Tunisia case. According to Chaabane (2002) the Social Security Fund 
displacement, setting up itinerant centres where the informal activities were carried out, was crucial for 
the program’s success.  
31
 Considering all the benefits offered (health care, family support, besides pension), this assumption is 
consistent with some evidence showing that in developing countries women are more proactive than 
men and respond more to programs benefiting their child (Buvinic and Gupta, 1997; Behrman and 
Wolfe, 2002). The assumption is also consistent with the fact that since the 80’s the world labor force 
growth is substantially higher for women than for men (Lim, 2002). Furthermore, in our case the 
women, rather than men, enjoy positive returns on contributing for the old age pension. 
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4. To take into account the technological progress, the baseline earnings for each new 
self-employed cohort are increased by the half of the long run real GDP growth 
(2,5%).32  
5. The age at which the independent worker starts full time work is 26 years old, 
consistent with the fact that 92% of the salaried employed force (men and women) 
from the INPS sample is more than 25 years old. We assume further, that the current 
cohort is older, and therefore starts to contribute at age 37 (the average self-employed 
age) and with higher base earnings.33 This assumption relies on the hypothesis that 
they are on the business for longer and that the more educated ones (with higher 
wages) will be more responsive to the policy.  
6. The retirement age for women and men are, respectively, 60 and 65 years. 
Accordingly, the length of contribution of the current cohort is 23 years for women 
and 28 years for men, whilst for the new employed groups it is 35 and 40 years, 
respectively, for women and men. The life expectancy is 75 years old for women and 
70 years old for men.  
7. The individual incomes evolve according to the life-cycle paths, estimated on the 
previous section.  
8. Finally, the discount rate (r) that we use to discount the program future costs and 
benefits is the riskless market interest rate (the real rate of the 10 years Treasury 
bond’s, 4,5%, according to Banco de Cabo Verde).34 Table 4 summarizes the income 
distribution, as considered on the projections 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 According to Banco de Cabo Verde (2006), that estimates the long run GPD ranging between 5% and 
7%. Here the objective is to be conservative, incorporating the likely decrease in the weight of the 
informal economy, given the country potential path toward a more developed economy. 
33
 Baseline incomes plus a standard deviation (see Table 2). 
34
 In line with Getler (1997), we are using the government marginal return on capital as the social 
discount rate. 
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Table 4: Baseline Income Distribution35 
 
 
Due to the impact on the system of the first cohort, the scheme is not 
financially sound on the time horizon 2011-2070, according to our results. Under the 
baseline scenario, the program’s net benefits amount to -2,3 billion CVE 
(approximately -2% of the 2010 GDP).36 Our results are, however, sensitive to both 
gender distribution and to the INPS enforcement capacity. Indeed, decreasing the 
impact of the new cohort of women on the system, by setting equal adherence rate for 
men and women, or halving the current cohort adherence rate, makes the scheme net 
present benefit positive. This latter assumption lowers the impact of the oldest and 
wealthier force on the system (the current cohort) that is estimated to leave the 
scheme completely by the end of 2052.37   
The program becomes financially sound, with a positive net present benefit of 
2,4 billion CVE, if we withdraw the current cohort from the system. However, even 
excluding the current cohort the program is still vulnerable to ageing. In fact reducing 
the length of the contribution to 15 years for women and 20 years for men and raising 
the life expectancy by 3 and 2 years for women and men, respectively, decreases the 
scheme revenues to expenditures ratio from 2,72 to 0,69, 
 
                                                          
35
 According to our assumptions on the current employed side, the total women and men joining the 
system in 2011 are respectively 340 and 206. Thus, for  instance, the program  total revenues with the 
female current employed force in 2011 is computed as follow:  
10%*[(50,6%*(340*507.744 )+6,2%*(340*557.304)+3,0%*(340*594996)+40,3%*(932.256*340) 
36
 According to the Central Bank GDP projections (BCV, 2010). Notice that all the figures from now on 
are in 2010 CVE, unless otherwise stated. 
37
 Notice that the system internal rate of return (the rate at which the scheme breaks even) hovers 
6,85%. 
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV
Current Employed Force 507.744 557.304 594.996 932.256
New Cohorts of Employed 338.124 387.684 425.376 762.636
Female 50,6% 6,2% 3,0% 40,3%
Male 48,3% 7,3% 4,6% 39,7%
Notes: Baseline incomes according to the Business Census (INE, 2002). The Baseline incomes for the
current cohort force are increased by one standard deviation. The gender distribution is according
to our sample on salaried workers  (INPS).
Income Distribution (yearly, CVE)
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Figure 1: Policy Main Impacts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own projections. 
 
 
Nonetheless, the new cohort’s case is resilient to a positive income shock (doubling 
the individuals’ earnings). Also, decreasing (halving) the discount rate, to put small 
weight on benefits and costs occurring far in the future, does not invert the sign of the 
scheme net benefit. In turn, halving the pension discount rate (to account for a future 
decrease on the country’s risk premium, for instance) make the new entrants case 
unsustainable, as shown in Table 5. Table 5 distinguishes the results for the total self-
employed work force from the case considering only the new cohorts, as from 2011. 
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Table 5: The Budgetary Impacts of the Self-Employed Social Security Framework (2011-2070) 
Notes: Contribution in period t (Ct) = 10% *wage of period t; Pension=80%*10 best wages of last 15 
years of contribution.  
1
 Pension of women=52,5%*10 best wages; pension of men=70%*10 best wages of last 15 years of 
contribution, according to the law. 
𝐶 =  
𝐶𝑡
 1+𝑟 𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0 ;  𝑃 =  
𝑃𝑡
 1+𝑟 𝑡
𝑈
𝑡=𝑇+1   
 
Hence, our results strongly suggest that the self-employed social security 
framework is redistributive across generations, benefiting the first group of 
contributors. The program is, as well as, redistributive for men to women. Accordingly, 
being the Cape Verdean women, in general, poorer and more vulnerable than men, we 
are compelled to state that vertical equity goals, within this target population, are, 
also, part of the direct objectives of the policy. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The Cape Verde public policy that we analyzed in this work project can benefit an 
important share of the country’s population. The policy benefits especially the poorest 
self-employed, those who are in an unfavorable position to access a yet 
underdeveloped financial market; the myopic business owners, who do not save 
properly, and have to rely on social pension when retired (and potentially face a higher 
income drop); and the independent female workers, in general. 
Including Current Cohort (million CVE)
Equal Halving Discount  Income Growth
Scenario Gender proportion Adherence Rate rate =6,5% rate = 0
Present Value of Contributions (C) 6.699,3 10.542,6 5.255,9 4.373,1 5.380,2
Present Value of Expenditures with Pensions (P) 9.038,7 9.517,6 5.220,7 4.587,0 7.524,2
Scheme Net Benefits (C-P) -2.339,4 1.025,0 35,2 -213,9 -2.144,0
Revenues to Expenditures ratio 0,74 1,11 1,01 0,95 0,72
Excluding Current Cohort (million CVE)
Halving  Doubling Halving 
Scenario Pension Discount Rate Income Discount Rate
Present Value of Contributions (C) 3.812,6 3.812,6 5.454,5 3.842 7.250,6
Present Value of Expenditures with Pensions (P) 1.402,7 4.166,2 3.797,3 5.540,6 4.166,2
Scheme Net Benefits (C-P) 2.409,8 -353,7 1.657,2 -1.698,7 3.084,4
Revenues to Expenditures ratio 2,72 0,92 1,44 0,69 1,74
Baseline
Ageing 1
Baseline
Sensitivity Analisys 
Sensitivity Analisys 
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According to our results and in the light of the data limitation, the scheme 
might face a period of budget imbalance, however. The effects of this imbalance on 
the Cape Verde economy will depend on how it will be financed. We believe that 
increasing the payroll tax for this special labor force can rise political (for being an 
unpopular measure) and administrative issues. As every kind of arrangement that 
relies on tax collection, we expect the self-employed program to generate deadweight 
loss, by encouraging individuals to adjust their behavior in order to avoid being taxed. 
Therefore, we presume that enforcement will be challenging for the INPS, which has to 
estimate as accurately as possible the informal businesses cash-flows, in order to cope 
with potential under reporting. Hence, a reform that lowers the individuals’ pension 
expectations is likely to increase the INPS burden in integrating the independent 
workers. 
Considering the case for debt financing (of a temporary shock), provided that 
the government faces no payment problem (i.e. is not at insolvency risk) and can issue 
bonds in, relatively, favorable terms, the macroeconomic effects of this debt, given the 
country exchange rate regime, might be not extremely distressing. 38 Though, the 
opportunity cost of this funding need, to support social security, can be quite high for a 
developing country, yet in big need of public investment.39  
As a final remark, we believe that success of this welfare state intervention rely 
significantly on the INPS enforcement capacity, on the soundness of the scheme 
management and on its  proficiency in addressing potential moral hazard problems. 
Furthermore, we consider that the achievements on the efficiency grounds are 
important to foster the implicit policy equity goals (namely gender inequality reduction 
and informal workers social integration). 
                                                          
38
 Provided that foreign capital inflows are able to reverse the increasing tendency of the domestic 
interest rate, or that the central bank has to accommodate the government interventions, so as to 
prevent the currency nominal appreciation.  
39
 Notice that given its trust fund (that amounts 15% of GDP), the INPS may be able to fund a probable 
budget imbalance, without requiring a more active government intervention. 
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Parameter β0 β1 β2 β3 β0 β1 β2 β3 β0 β1 β2 β3 β0 β1 β2 β3
Estimate 8,187 0,077 -0,001 0,133 7,890 0,130 -0,001 -0,033 9,222 0,077 -0,001 -0,004 9,593 0,107 -0,001 0,135
Std Error 0,073 0,004 0,000 0,013 0,089 0,005 0,000 0,013 0,084 0,004 0,000 0,009 0,26 0,014 2E-04 0,034
t-statistics 112,60 18,76 -15,18 10,27 88,17 28,49 -25,04 -2,53 109,7 17,60 -13,19 -0,41 36,23 7,79 -6,07 4,00
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Pseudo R square 0,021 0,024 0,039 0,048
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV
Appendix 1. Data Characteristics and Estimation Results 
 
1. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: INPS 
 
 
 
2. Estimation results of the life –cycle wages 
 
Equation: 𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 
 
Notes: Regressions run in E-views 6, on the sample of the INPS current contributors 
with monthly income  8.800 CVE. Number of observations = 35.218  
Robust standard errors were used (Huber Sandwich standard errors & covariance). 
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3. The self-employed life cycle income path (for the low, median and high incomes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Estimations 
 
 
4. Men return on pension contribution: sensitivity analysis for the median income case 
       Discount rates (r)                                                                             Life Expectancy (T) 
 
 
Source: Own Estimations 
 
Notes: 
1. P=present value of pension (P).  P=Pension* 
1
(1+𝑟)𝑡
𝑇−25
𝑡=41 , where 
 
Pension = 
 𝑤𝜌
10
  (1 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2((25 + 𝑖)2 − (24 + 𝑖)2)
𝑗
𝑖=1
34
𝑗=25 ), and   ρ=0,8 
 
2. C=present value of contributions. 
𝐶 = 𝑤 (1 +   (1 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2((25 + 𝑖)2 −  24 + 𝑖)2 ) 
𝑗
𝑖=1
39
𝑗 =1 , where =0,1 
3. r=discount rate, the baseline case discount rate = 3,5% 
4. T= men life expectancy. At baseline scenario T=70   
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Appendix 3. Survey to Informal Workers Results 
The survey was carried out in Praia (the Cape Verde's capital), between April 19 and 
April 24. The methodology used was direct interviews. Notice that the survey aim at 
validating the empirical strategy used, only. Thus, merely few concerns with the 
randomization were considered and no major tests were performed in order to 
validate the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample Size 10
Gender Distribution
Male 6
Female 4
Activity Sectors
Transport Communications 20%
Construction 20%
Retails 20%
Small Manufacturies 20%
Other Services 20%
Average AGE 39
Average Years of the Business 13
Education Levels
Il l iterated 10%
Primary School 30%
Lower Secondary school 40%
Vocational Education 10%
College Degree 10%
Reasons for running the Business
Became unemployed 30%
Never found a formal job 10%
Choose to run the business 50%
Other 10%
Wage (monthly, CVE)
20000-40000 50%
40000-60000 30%
60000-80000 10%
>80000 10%
How often substitute  the own business activity for a formal job
Complement the business with a formal Job 10%
Frequently, but not in a regular fashion 40%
Never 50%
Social Insurance Protection
INPS Contributors 10%
Knew the 2003's Self-Employed Law 0%
Want to Join INPS 90%
Total Respondent 100%
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Appendix 4. List of Professional Category, as required by the 2003’s  
Self-Employed Framework 
 
                 Profession                                                                                                Yearly Income (CVE) 
Source: Government Budget Law of 2003 (Law N0 18/VI/2003) 
Notes: This list of professional category is for tax purposes. The yearly incomes refer to the minimum 
that government takes into account when taxing the services rendered.  
 Engineers agronomists 1.620 
 Agrarian engineers-technician 1.620 
 Architects  1.920 
 Engineers and engineer-technician 1.920 
 Civil designers , topographers and constructors 1.500 
 Painters, sculptors, decorators and others 1.000 
 Singers, musicians and artists of television 800 
 Journalists and reporters 800 
 Economists, auditors and consultants 1.800 
 Accountants, technician of accounts and keep-books 1.500 
 Technician and specialists in management of human resources and 
organization 
1.800 
 Nurses, physiotherapists and massagistas 1.500 
 Obstetricians, dentists and others 800 
 Lawyers 1.800 
 Legal advisors  1.800 
 Solicitors  800 
 Dentists, doctors of general clinic  1.800 
 Doctors of specialty  2.100 
 Medical veterinarians  1.500 
 Psychologists  1.350 
 College Professors   1.200 
 Teachers  800 
 Master of sport or crafts  800 
 Technician of computer science, telecommunications or of information 
systems  
2.100 
 Official dispatcher  2.100 
 Commission agents 2.100 
 Administrators   1.200 
 Typists and operators of computer science  600 
 Others with superior, average course or technician 1.200 
 
